Now that we’ve seen the White House Plan to bring down healthcare costs – I’d like to offer a counter suggestion. Here are three steps that would ‘immediately’ bring down list/net pricing and reduce the cost of insurance.
#1) Eliminate structured, tiered patient out of pocket and move to a graduated out-of-pocket system based on family income level (opt-in ONLY)
One-size-fits all copay levels are regressive and discriminate against the working poor – while making drugs artificially INEXPENSIVE to high income earners. Currently, there’s a question whether tying patient benefit to ability to pay is legal and most agree that it’s not fair. Why not move to a system where the goal is to charge a nominal fee for each BRANDED prescription tied to income level. A secure, opt-in databased could be pinged for patients seeking to pay below the maximum out-of-pocket level.
I would suggest maintenance of Gx/Brand differentiated out-of-pocket for low priced (MAC’ed) Gx.
#2) Require pharmaceutical companies and PBMs/Payers to negotiate over true market access
There’s lots of evidence that out-of-pocket requirements lead to patients foregoing or postponing care. A much better solution would be for Pharma Cos to contract for access (see above at truly nominal out-of-pocket levels). In exchange, pharma would contract PBMs/Payers down to a level that enabled the payers to reduce/eliminate copays. Further, since Pharma would be on the hook for price increases, there would be very limited incentive for price increases. This move would single handedly decrease the perverse incentive to have a HIGH list price, larger rebate, and low net price. Additionally, co-insurance insurance would be largely eliminated with #1 above…
Payers, for their part, would commit to a price where they could provide access to the broadest amount of their patient base. Explicit conversations would be had about the appropriate place in therapy for Gx and Branded alternatives. I’d suggest the PBMs adopt a model like Italy’s – there they provide a price that they’re willing to pay, up to an annual maximum for a given indication, product class, or product. Use beyond this maximum would be provided at the pharma co’s expense. Pharma companies then decide whether they want to ‘take it or leave it.’
#3) Remove the Medicaid Best price requirement for instances where the caps in #2 are surpassed and/or for outcomes-based contracts (in situations where the product didn’t work)
Acute readers will note that #2 isn’t possible with the current rules regarding Medicaid best pricing. Allowing exceptions to this policy will enable increase creativity in value-based pricing. To qualify, value-based contracts would have to include potential RISKS and BENEFITS for BOTH parties – outcomes would determine whether the product worked and, built into this proposal, payers would commit to paying MORE in cases where clinical endpoints were met/surpassed in real-world use.
As Michael Kleinrock has demonstrated pharma is ALREADY picking up ALL of the net effects of price increases ON PATIENTS. The price increase game is largely over, and the ones left holding the bag are payers with the weakest hands. Moving to these strategies would increase certainty and ease actuarial risk. That would, in turn decrease the cost of insurance coverage – and this effect would be magnified if we increased the total number of people covered with comprehensive insurance. I’d also like to see implementation of truly portable healthcare coverage – paid for by employers, employees, and/or the government (for the record, I’m against single payer but these are bigger/longer conversations, beyond today’s scope).
Decrease the incentives for high prices and you decrease the likelihood of having high prices. Suggesting that government programs lack the negotiating power they have (pharma feels the massive power of the Part D providers every year during the contract renewal process) perpetuates a political myth. I can see the argument that Medicaid pays too much for brand new, high priced biologics; but I don’t understand the suggestion that Part D lacks some power that the same providers wield for their Commercial coverage. (?) States, including Massachusetts, are already asking for waivers outside of current Medicaid rules – maybe the adoption of #2 above for States Medicaid would help to meet their needs and challenge Pharma to provide ‘fair’ prices for open access.
Chiral Logic 